ASIA CENTRE BANGALORE           

Chairman

Mr. A.P. Venkateshwaran  Former Foreign Secretary

Vice Chairman

Mr. Peter Sinai IFS (retd)

Director      

Lt. Gen (Retd.) Ravi Eipe

Governing Board

Member Directory

Speaker Profiles

Join Us

Support Asia Centre

Contact Us

  Asia Centre

 1843 First Floor, 6th Cross,   20th Main,  J.P Nagar,  Bangalore Karnataka 560078, India; 

Call: (+91 80) 26595150, 26593689

asiacentrebangalore@hotmail.com

Email us

Asia Centre Home  

Seminar                         Summary Reports   

  "Strategic Analysis and Opinions "by Maj. Gen (Retd.) Ashok K. Mehta

Vice Admiral (Retd)   P J Jacob

The Current Scenario

By  Shri K.V. Rajan, former Ambassador to Nepal :

Four months after the historic elections in Nepal ( April 10, 2008 ) the new government had not been formed.  Longer delay would squander the unique opportunity of ending the country’s continuing socio-economic-political crisis.  Even if a new government is formed, the prospects do not look bright for smooth governance, the peace process and Constitution-making within two years.

The likely scenario may well be a façade of democracy and collapsing governance, a breakdown of law and order, with serious implications for India ’s security. On the Indian side of the border, administrative deficiencies complicate the situation further.  India is in no position to denounce political infighting in Nepal .  But India has to be proactive, not only to safeguard its own security concerns, but also to mitigate the human cost to Nepal from instability and disorder.

Positive elements:

·               The holding of the April 10 election was undoubtedly an achievement in itself.  It opened up the possibility of a new, inclusive, democratic Nepal .

·               The Maoists have come into the mainstream.  It is a unique example of an extreme left insurgency which has turned to democratic means.  It is unlikely that the Maoists will take to the jungle again. They are now locked into the democratic process.

·               The April 10 election, though flawed, was credible enough and relatively free of violence, belying many fears to the contrary.

·               The transition to the Republic has been peaceful, with Gyanendra refraining from resisting the popular call for an end to the monarchy.

·               The election result is certainly a mandate for change:

§      The Maoists have won emphatic victory, although short of a parliamentary majority.

§      Madhesis have become a new power centre, with their men in the 4^th, 5^th and 6^th places in the new Constituent Assembly.

§      Most of the old leaders from mainstream parties, including the Koirala family, have been rejected.

§      The monarchy is also rejected, even in a ceremonial role.

§      The CA is the most inclusive body in Nepal – Dalits (50 out of 575); Madhesis (204); Janajatis (192); Women (190).

§      The Maoists are showing flexibility on several issues in response to demands by other parties.

Negative elements

§ Four months after election, the government was not yet formed.

§ The election results tend to paralyse government and the process of constitution-making.

§ The Maoists won 220 of the 575 seats, more than combined total of the NC and the UML (213), but the Maoists are at the mercy of other parties in the sense that if the latter act as spoilers (which they clearly wish to do) they can block decisions.

§ Political leaders tend to bypass the CA, indulging in horse-trading out of personal ambition or party interest.

§ Overall, a culture of impunity and violence prevails. The much touted “New Nepal” is currently a republic of uncertainty, and may well become republic of fear.

          Other deficits:

          Mistrust among the political leaders and parties; political opportunism, shifting alliances, absence of leaders with vision and stature.

         Poor institutional underpinnings; politicised bureaucracy, demoralised police, the unpopular army and partisan media.

The election of the President, the Vice President and the Speaker came about after prolonged bargaining and horse-trading.  This does not inspire confidence, as both the President (a NC-Madhesi candidate) and the Vice President (an official candidate of the Madhesi parties) lack credibility. The election result was due to the determined bid by the other parties to keep the Maoists out.

The core issue of security management was left unaddressed. The Army is unwilling to accept both the integration of Maoist cadres and the “democratisation” move for the intake of Madhesis. The higher political profile of the Army Chief, encouraged by G.P. Koirala, not a good sign.

The main concern is not so much the integration of Maoist guerillas as the proposal for compulsory military training and periodic refresher courses for every Nepali adult.

 Basic Question: “Can Maoists change their DNA?”

 The jury is still out. Many of their actions and statements do not inspire confidence that they have decisively given up violence and intimidation.

On present evidence, it seems that they may have changed their strategy and tactics, but not their ideological goals.

The Maoists themselves emphasise that their success is due to the “fusion of ballot and bullet”, and insist that they have not abandoned armed struggle.

They do not regret their past violence; they rationalise their present violence. The activities of the Youth Communist League clearly indicate that the Maoist want to retain their parallel police to enforce their will.

The Maoists’ dilemma: their desire to lead the government and occupy key posts, although aware that parliamentary arithmetic will not enable them to deliver on promises.  Hence their frequent threats to stay out of the government unless their terms are accepted.

Recourse to non-democratic methods must be corrected, perhaps in concert with other countries.

The Maoists are the only party with a clear agenda, motivation, strategic thinking, organizational strength, discipline and leadership.They will probably adopt all means to ensure their sweeping victory in the next election two years hence.

Internal divisions in the Maoist party notwithstanding, there is no serious threat to its party discipline and unity.

Regarding India , the Maoists have generally moderated their rhetoric; they have regular contacts with Indian leadership and realise that they need India in order to remain in power.  However, they openly assert eagerness to strengthen ties with China . Maoist leader Mahara went to China , Prachanda has often expressed keenness to visit China , and the Maoist appeasement of China on Tibet , are early indications of a definite Maoist tilt towards China .

Maoist demands, such as the revision of Nepal-India Treaty of 1950, ending Gurkha recruitment to the Indian Army, renegotiating   agreements on water resources, and regulating open border, should be taken seriously, even if the Maoists do not press them for some time due to their preoccupations with consolidating political power.

The Maoists will not directly provoke India , but will find ways to assert their nationalism, even using former palace loyalists, with whom they have a natural convergence, especially on equidistance between India and China .

Their success will embolden Indian Naxalites to emulate their example: to use violence until the state is discredited and abdicates its responsibilities, then give the impression of joining mainstream competitive politics, but continue to promote their ideological through a combination of democratic and undemocratic means.

 The Nepali Congress and the UML are demoralised and directionless. Both lack inner party democracy (especially the NC)        and suffer from serious inter-party divisions.  Koirala’s age and         failing health should be matter of concern for the NC’s future. He was evidently keen on continuing as Prime Minister, falsely implying that     he had India ’s support.  If the UML joins the Maoists in the new      government excluding others, the NC may be able to revive itself    in partnership with the Madhesis.

 The Madhesi Phenomenon

The MJF, the TMDP (widely believed to be supported by India)  and two factions of the Sadbhavana Party have emerged as important power centres, but they tend to overplay their hand, creating a backlash (e.g. their demand for a Madhesi state, their winning the posts of both the President and the Vice President, the Vice President taking the oath of office in Hindi. One should not exaggerate the pro-India implications in Madhesi posturing, though they can be an effective counterweight to the Maoists).

India

·               There is general goodwill for India on account of its role in bringing the Maoists and political parties together and in “mainstreaming” the former.

·               However, there is dissatisfaction in all parties because of unrealistic expectations that India will favour them.

·               There is a general perception that India has its own security-driven agenda.

·               Indian moves on future political crisis situations, the integration of the PLA in the Nepal Army and in Madhesi issues will be closely watched;

·               India should explore the possibility of reaching some understanding with China so that either side is assured that its legitimate core concerns will be respected by other.

·               The “Special relationship” as defined in the 1950 Treaty is already dead; and mega-hydel projects are most unlikely to take off because of increasingly nationalistic posturing by the Maoists.

·               India should avoid being overly engaged on Terai issues or with Madhesi groups.  This would be counterproductive. The real problem for India could be, not so much the Maoist-led government as the prospect of instability and breakdown of law and order and the unraveling of Nepal in case the Maoists keep out of government.

·               India ’s present posture is a mix of laissez-faire and the concept of ‘responsibility to protect’.  India has in the past experimented with a Nehruvian mix of calibrated democracy and British-India neo-colonialism, the Gujral doctrine; the BJP’s mix of hegemonism and Hindutva, as the base for a special relationship.

·               The principle of ‘responsibility to protect’, if invoked with sensitivity and concern for well-being of Nepal rather than support for a particular leader or party, may not be controversial.  It may even be welcomed by the Nepalese, who desperately want peace and are disillusioned with the Maoists as well as main political parties. (Example: India ’s success in bringing the Maoists and political parties together against the absolute rule of Gyanendra).

·               India’s priorities should be: effective management of Nepal’s sensitivity as a small, landlocked country; economic inter-dependence; and integration, especially through sub-regional projects involving Nepal’s Terai and the adjacent Indian States; avoiding visible dependence on the power centre of the day but dealing transparently with Nepal as a nation, so that there is a strong popular support for Indian policies; anticipating and defusing misunderstandings before they became irritants; adopting a low profile diplomacy which gives sense of security to all political actors, especially in the present unstable situation.

Future of Indo-Nepal Relations

By   Maj Gen (Retd) Ashok Mehta, 

He recalled his numerous and extensive visits to Nepal , his experience in recruiting Gurkhas and with ex-servicemen drawing pensions for their service with the Indian Army. 

The questions arising for us from the developments in Nepal are:

1) Can we trust the Maoists?  We must wait to find out.

2) Can the old Nepal change to a new Nepal ? 

3) Will China and Pakistan gain increasing influence in Nepal ? 

India must be vigilant not to be caught on the wrong foot.  The peace process has brought the Maoists to power.  A left-wing government in Nepal could be a stimulus to Indian Maoists.  We should consider the Maoist rhetoric as a phase in the past.

The Nepalese are keen on building up their country anew.  It is a work in progress, though they did have some starting trouble. 

Nepal has a history of revolts and rebellions.  So the Maoist upsurge is not completely new.  While previously the country was ruled by an elite, a basic change has taken place, with popular involvement and empowerment. 

The people’s war by the Maoists has achieved its main objective.  The election of the Constituent Assembly is a triumph for them.

Some Maoists even consider that their struggle has ended prematurely with no storming of the palace.  It is the first time an underground rebel group has come to power through elections and become the main parliamentary party.  It is also the first time the Madhesis and other ethnic groups have secured significant positions.  Outside observers went wrong in predicting the results of the elections. 

How to deal with the Maoist-led government? is the question.  It is not a purely Maoist government.  It is worth noting that ten years of ‘people’s war’ could not achieve what the 19-day ‘andolan’ (protest movement) did.  The Madhesis have also taken to their own ‘andolan’. 

There was an intelligence failure on our side in not foreseeing the victory of the Maoist wave.  The mood was changing: a claim that it was now their turn to rule.  Even ex-servicemen in Nepal tended to support the Maoists. 

Coercion played a part in the Maoist tactics.  They also appealed to the ‘sons of the soil’ sentiment.  They have been locked into the peace process by the people. 

Madhesis have gained one-third of the seats, though hitherto scorned as ‘dhotiwallahs’.  Now they have a power share.  They contribute 77 percent of the revenues of Nepal , but only 7 percent is spent on their region. The Maoists will not accept special demands by the Madhesis.  The other parties, the MJF, the UML and the NC will find unity difficult to achieve. 

Now a national government is needed until the constitution is framed.  Will it turn into a presidential rule?  There are various possible combinations for a coalition.  An alliance of the leftist parties is one.  There will be a generational change when the older politicians are gone. 

The Maoist aim is to go for elections in two and a half years and get a two-thirds majority.  The final objective is to transform Nepal into a one-party state, similar to the West Bengal model.  (Prachanda has been invited to Kolkata by the West Bengal government). 

India ’s main change of policy is giving up the concept of relying on “the twin pillars” (the monarchy and the democratic parties) and recognising the people’s choice.   Both the Foreign Minister and the Congress high command have accepted the Maoist victory.  It was not politic for the Indian government to say that it would have preferred the Nepal Congress to be the main party in Nepal , but that it could work with the Maoist party. 

The Indian government has sponsored a conference on Nepal and India to take place in Patna in September.  It is noteworthy that Mrs. Bhattarai has spoken of a mandate by the people for a new Indo-Nepal relationship.  Nepal wants “equi-proximity” with China and India , not distance from either of the two neighbours.  Prachanda, who had said in 2007 that Nepal looked to China for support, has observed in 2008. “ India has changed; so we have changed.”  This denotes a pragmatic attitude. Without India , Nepal cannot prosper.  (Prachanda’s interview to the Hindu carries the same message of pragmatism). 

The leftward direction in Nepal could radicalise the youth and increase the strength of the YCL.  The Maoists have good contacts with the Left front government of West Bengal .  The ideologues still believe in armed struggle.  There is an active linkage with the Indian Maoists. Prachanda has held some discussions with the Indian Maoist leader, Azad. Azad has, however, attacked Prachanda for making compromises with the enemy. 

China has different concerns, relating to Tibet ’s future.  The Chinese backed the King and the monarchy, when they had combated the Maoists for “anti-governmental activities”. China is now trying to regain its influence in Nepal . 

The US too, after opposing the Maoist wave in Nepal in a sustained campaign, is now adopting a nuanced policy.  It wants to check China gaining greater influence in Nepal .  Richard Boucher (Deputy Secretary in the US State Department) spoke of ‘convergence with India ’ on some matters concerning Nepal , but also of ‘some divergence’.  The US is highly antipathetic to the Nepal Maoists, but will watch the actions of the Maoists to assess the trend. 

India and Nepal have had close military level relations.  India ’s Defence and External Affairs Ministries have to coordinate the policy direction for the future effectively.  The ex-servicemen lobby could be engaged to suit Indian interests.  There is a residual threat in that Maoist cadres have not given up their arms fully.  The Maoist guerrillas cannot all be absorbed in the Nepal Army.  What happens to the militants left out, especially those with arms, is a matter of concern. 

The Madhesis are a potential tinderbox.  Pahadis who come to the plains and settle in the plains could cause friction.  The Madhesis proximity to UP and Bihar is a worry, if armed gangs which include criminal elements infiltrate into India .  With some 12 million Nepalese living in India , we have to exercise constant vigil to ensure that there is no disturbance of law and order from them.

Current Situation and its import

He is currently Director (North), Ministry of External Affairs; He previously served in the Indian Embassy, Kathmandu and later was the Consul General in Birganj in Nepal , from 2001 to 2007.  A gist of his talk is given below.

The elections to the Constituent Assembly have changed Nepal ’s politics irrevocably.  The results were mainly determined by the youth of Nepal and the mrginalised groups, including Janjatis, Madhesis, Dalits and women voters.  They voted for political change.  This verdict by a more inclusive and plural society replaced the hill-centric nationalism.

The Maoists emerged as the single largest party, securing 29% of the votes and 38% of the seats (226).  But they do not have a simple majority in the house.  The political parties of Nepal deserve to be commended on the elections.

During the peace process, Indian policy was to engage with all the key political actors.  India ’s stand was that it was for the people to decide who should govern them and how.  India is proud to have played a part in this historic transformation.

One big gain is that the Madhes now has a voice in the Constituent Assembly which cannot be ignored.  The Madhesis have one third of the seats.  They form a new force in politics.

It is not clear how the new Nepalese identity would be defined.  It could be based on a narrow cultural and linguistic aspect or a broader sociological spread.  The people’s mandate and the trend of successive amendments to the constitution have made Nepalese politics and institutions more inclusive.

Forming the Government.

After the post-election euphoria, the election of the president and vice-president signified a big setback to the Maoists.  It shows the increasing polarisation of politics and the fragility of the peace process in Nepal . 

The fractured mandate of the Assembly should enjoin all the parties to cooperate and form a government of national unity.  A government based on a single party or an alliance would be short-lived and unstable.  The CPN-M as the largest party has earned the right to lead the government.

Hitherto the ruling elite in Kathmandu had whipped up an anti-Indian psychosis to bolster patriotic sentiments.  Governments were formed and changed frequently:  there were 16 governments in the 18 years between 1990 and 2006.

Issues before the Government.

The big issue relates to the disposition of the 19,000 armed Maoist combatants now quartered in camps.  The Maoists want them integrated with the Nepal Army, which, for its part, is wary of its integrity being impaired thereby.  The other parties are also wary of it.

Regarding the Indo-Nepal Treaty, the new leadership in Nepal must clarify whether it wants to revise the treaty fully or only to amend it.  India and Nepal held talks at the level of Foreign Secretaries in February 2001 on reviewing the treaty.  We remain willing to discuss the issue.  We see no great difficulty in arriving at a mutually agreed revised text.

The Maoists have spoken of ‘regulating’ Nepal ’s open border with India .  We too want some regulation, but no restriction of movement, given the close kinship ties between people on either side of the border.

Gurkha recruitment to the Indian Army has been opposed by the Maoists.  The new government has to decide its policy on this issue.  If recruitment is stopped, the youth in Nepal will be left without an attractive avenue of employment.  It is noteworthy that pension payments from the Indian Army help several million households in Nepal .

The new Nepal is a diverse Nepal .  It answers to a more inclusive and egalitarian political structure with more ethnic identities and cultural differences.  The ‘Jan andolan’, particularly with respect to the Madhesi and other ethnic groups in the Terai, has helped this broadening.

  Indo-Nepal relations:

Geographical necessity and intense people-to-people relations ensure that the two countries simply cannot look away from each other.

70 percent of Nepal ’s foreign trade is with India .  40 percent of its FDI is from India .  So are 40 percent of its foreign tourists, 100 percent of its fossil fuels and 16 percent of its dry season power.  The Nepal rupee is pegged to the Indian rupee.  This, with more trade integration, has given greater monetary stability to Nepal than many less developed countries in conflict situations enjoy. India ’s economic aid to Nepal is, in money terms, value and spread, easily the highest.

There are high stakes in hydropower, irrigation and flood control.  Cooperation in these areas could transform not only Nepal , but also states like Bihar , UP, Uttarkhand and West Bengal .  It would also enhance bilateral relations.

After nearly five decades of politicised mutual suspicion and distrust, a beginning has been made in this area of cooperation ( Upper Karnali , Arun III, and West Seti ).  Nepalese are realising the value of cooperation with India for economic benefit. 

We must make concerted efforts to engage the Nepalese living in India , who number around 9 million.  They could help to neutralise the anti-India campaign which was used as a strategic tool by the Kathmandu ruling elite until now. 

Since Nepal is a much smaller country, India needs to be the more generous partner, with more sensitivity for the concerns and compulsions of the former.

There is a tremendous untapped potential for a mutually rewarding partnership between the two countries.  It is for Nepal to decide the pace and the terms of such a bilateral relationship.

The transition to a stable, democratic, inclusive and peaceful polity in Nepal would answer to the aspirations of its people and also serve our long-term interest.

Discussion

The discussion began with three questions.  1) Whether there are Maoists among the recruited Gurkhas for our army?  2) What would have happened if the king had not agreed to go in the face of the general demand for the end of the monarchy?  3) Have the Maoists lost some relevance after their victory without a revolution?

Maj. Gen. Mehta said that the first turning point of the transition was the palace massacre, which brought Gyanendra to the throne.  One of the possible scenarios at that time was to retain the monarchy, but in a ceremonial form in the parliamentary system. He explained the different categories of Gurkhas who were drawing pensions. Some of them were sympathetic to the Maoists.

Shri Rajan said that there is a convergence between the far left and the far right in that both are nationalistic, pro-change and unfavorable to parliamentary democracy.  The loyalists pressed King Birendra to consolidate powers within the palace elite. 

To another question relating to Prachanda’s interview to the Hindu, Shri Rajan replied that the Maoists had a clear vision of socio-economic progress.  They want science education to be improved and Nepal modernised.  They had also brought benefits to the poor and thereby reaped the reward of gaining more credibility.

Maj. Gen. Mehta added that the Nepal Congress and the UML were overconfident about the elections.  The Maoists controlled some 80 percent of the country and ran a parallel government there. Local commissars under their control got the PLA cadres to do social work in the villages, thereby securing votes for the Maoist party. 

Shri Gururaj Rao said, in regard to Prachanda’s keenness to develop Nepal ’s science and technology, that cooperation between the two countries can indeed be intensified. There is already a memorandum of understanding to develop cooperation in agriculture, meteorological research, etc., and to set up science learning centers for training students.  He knew from his tours that Nepal ’s colleges could boast of some brilliant students.  Nepal just lacked the facilities.  Herbal extraction and classification could be a promising line. This kind of research work could be commercialised for Nepal ’s benefit.

Shri Rajan took a question on China ’s competition with India in extending its influence in Nepal , and another on the Nepalese elite in Kathmandu being anti-Indian.  He said that India should not be seen as being aligned with the US on Nepal ’s political evolution.  As regards China , he said that India and China could have a serious dialogue on policy, so that neither need encroach on the other’s interests.  China may not go along with Nepal playing the ‘Chinese card’.  India could expand its investments in Nepal and also liberalise imports from Nepal .  The Indo-Sri Lanka free trade agreement offers a precedent for it. The Nepalese complain of non-tariff barriers by India .  They resent transport of containers with merchandise being stuck at the border posts with some perishables rotting away.  He considered that India has the advantage over China in developing cooperation with Nepal which involved the people.

Shri G. Rao recalled that Nepal played the China card repeatedly during the reign of King Mahendra.  There was active promotion of anti-India materials by certain groups.  But outside Kathmandu the people had and still have tremendous goodwill for India , which is close to their hearts.  He added that Pakistan ’s ISI, disliking the popularity of India , indulged in subversive activities like circulating fake Indian currency.  Under the Maoist regime, relations with India could improve if conditions are favourable to bilateral cordiality. 

Shri B. Raman said that China acts with a long-term strategic thinking.  It fears disruption in Tibet through uprisings encouraged from outside.  It is waiting for the passing of the Dalai Lama to foist its nominee as the successor. 

A member intervened to say that Nepal as a mainly Hindu country was unlikely to accept the Chinese way and would lean more towards India . 

Shri Eric Gonsalves suggested that India could help Nepal to run medical colleges like the one in Pokhran. 

Shri A.M. Khaleeli forecast problems for the Maoists in governing the country. He added that India should not interfere or take part in American activities in Nepal .  Another issue he raised was regarding dams on rivers in Nepal flowing into India for generating electric power and for flood control, which would benefit both Nepal and India . 

Shri Rajan answered a question whether the Nepalese favoured the movement demanding Gorkhaland in the north of West Bengal state.  He said there was some sneaking sympathy for the India-based Gurkhas among the Nepalese, but that the Maoists have not indicated their support for the demand. 

Maj. Gen. Mehta added that Subhash Gheising was a respected figure and that a movement for ‘Greater Nepal’ could pose a danger for us, with the large Nepalese diaspora in India being drawn in. 

On Gurkha recruits, Shri Rajan explained that they had openings in the Nepal police, the Nepal Army and in the Indian army.  Maj. Gen. Mehta, appreciating a point made by a lady member that the Indian soldiers should be given due facilities and equipment to take on possible encroachment by the Chinese, said that India should not get deluded by Chinese or Nepalese talk of goodwill.  Whoever rules Nepal is aware that it is sandwiched between two great powers.  Nepal does not want to be crushed between them.  It will rope in Pakistan and China to keep India in check.  Nepal is ‘India-locked’ and over-dependent on India .  This factor needs to be borne in mind.  China will surely compete with India to advance its interests in Nepal .  There are 19 China Study Centres in Nepal

Conclusion 

Asia Centre’s previous seminar on Nepal was held on April 8, 2006 .  In the two years since then, Nepal has taken a hopeful turn, exceeding the expectations of many observers.  Soon after Asia Centre’s recent seminar of August 9, 2008, the tortuous Nepalese peace process has at last yielded encouraging results: the Constituent Assembly is set to take up its task of drafting a new constitution based on Nepal’s current political realities; a coalition government has been formed, with the CPN (M) in the lead and Prachanda sworn in as the new Prime Minister (August 18. 2008).  It is a magnificent transformation brought about by the people of Nepal , who began to shape their political future with the Jan Andolan in 1990 and a second Jan Andolan in 2006.  They have created a republic liberated from monarchical autocracy with its arbitrary whims and palace intrigues. 

The prospects of the republic are still unclear: the hopeful trend could continue, if the political parties act responsibly to ensure a stable nation intent on building up the prosperity of its people.  In this they can count on the ready assistance of friendly foreign partners, with India leading.  On the contrary, if there is a reversion to the old habits of inter-party and intra-party conflict and politicking, it could undo and nullify Nepal ’s democratic achievement. 

Nepal is too close and intimate a neighbour for India to neglect or ignore.  Instability in Nepal will inevitably undermine the stability of the adjacent Indian states.  Nepal ’s security is bound up with India ’s in a strategic sense as well.  As a small country lying between China and India , Nepal is for us the barometer of Chinese pressure. 

All the four seminar speakers took the China factor as the major premise of their presentations.  India has come through a perilous period of political turbulence and the Maoist struggle for power in Nepal .  It could have deflected our own trajectory of growth.  India ’s sterling contribution was to coax the seven Nepalese political parties to reach a consensual agreement with the Maoist party, so that the latter could emerge above ground as a respectable political force backed by the voters.  No doubt this outcome has its dangers for us in the sense that the Maoist party in power next door can be a stimulus to and a model for India ’s Naxalite groups.  But the big difference is that the Nepal Maoists joined the political mainstream and contested the elections with success, while our own militant malcontents prefer to carry on their armed struggle against civil society hoping for a revolution to ripen and sweep them to power.

 For India the China factor looms large, since the Chinese Communist Party is now well placed to intensify its relations with the CPN (M) and CPN (UML), even as state-to-state relations between China and Nepal advance in all fields and Chinese soft power penetrates Nepalese society and youth.  The Chinese will not disclose any hint of predatory intent regarding Nepal , but they do harbour designs to prevent the Nepalese from gravitating into the Indian orbit via the open Nepal-India border of 1700 km., attracted by India ’s broader economy and liberal polity. They will establish their outposts of  fellow-feeling in Terai as well as upper Nepal .  They will use the lure of attractive consumer goods to reach northern parts of India as well. 

The Chinese also have to keep vigil on the Tibetans living in Nepal , lest the disgruntled refugees, with or without Western collusion, foment insurgency in Tibet when the Dalai Lama passes away.  China rebooted its Nepal policy to adjust to the emerging political realities after 2006; but so did India , quietly dumping its policy of relying on “the twin pillars”, one of which (the monarchy) had begun to crumble.

Nepal ’s discontent with the Indo-Nepal Treaty of 1950 has a salience in this context.  China has offered Nepal arms before and will offer them again, even for free.  The provision of the treaty which bans such military transactions with other powers will be disputed; if India sticks to its retention rigidly, the condition will simply be ignored.  India ’s nuanced and sophisticated policy on Nepal since 2006 has anticipated this contingency.  India has promised to work with Nepal on amending or revising the treaty.  Prachanda has come to India in mid-September 2008 with a draft treaty.  We have some key strengths.  The process is likely to be long and complex, but our negotiators can keep a steady hold on the vital interests of India in Nepal without provoking hostile sentiments in Kathmandu .  India has to adjust to the aspirations of the Maoist-nationalist combination in power in Nepal .  We have to draw our red lines with realism and a pragmatic sense of what can be achieved in current times.  The open border is a related issue where again India has advantages not to be overlooked by Nepalese nationalism. 

The ethnic diversity of Nepal is now more prominently represented in the Constituent Assembly. This is cause for celebration.  But this variegated representation comes with sharper ethnic divisiveness between the hill people (paharis) and the Terai dwellers.  It accentuates other divisions, especially because the Madhesis are seen by the paharis and the Kathmandu elite as Indo-philes and surrogate Indians.  This situation calls for extreme tact and delicacy on the part of all Indians, particularly Indians in the adjoining Indian states of UP and Bihar , to avoid suspicion that we are making common cause with one ethnic group at the expense of other Nepalese.  The very circumstance of socio-political affinity across the border works against India ’s overall interests in developing all-round harmonious relations with Nepal .  One development which removes a friction point is that the term “Hindu” in Nepal ’s official name has been omitted.

Indian security has been affected by Pakistan ’s clandestine efforts in past years to stir up Terai Muslims as proxy agents to subvert peace and security on the Indian side and to sow communal division.  A further complication is the ease with which smugglers can exploit the open border for criminal activities.  Apart from improving our liaison with Nepal ’s agencies to thwart such hostile moves involving the ISI of Pakistan, we should strengthen our own border controls and political overview by stationing trained officials from the Union government to liaise, advise and act in concert with the state government officials in the state capitals and in border check posts.  If the central purview and monitoring of India ’s sensitive northern border (not only the Nepal border) is loose or lax, and the existing federal arrangement inadequate to tighten it, the necessary changes should be made to correct the deficiency.   

The US role in Nepal in the period 1990-2008 was wrong-headed.  We have to be careful to keep our distance and our counsel before joining with a major power in demarches of doubtful legitimacy in Nepal , although there may be a tactical convergence of interest in particular cases.  

Cooperation between the armed services and the border security forces on both sides has to be given very high priority.  Here again, there are gaps in our own coordination and capacity for internal consensus building.  We cannot afford our army and the civil governmental departments concerned speaking in different voices. 

India is keen to make a joint success of Prachanda’s first visit to India as Prime Minister of Nepal. Both sides have expectations and the willingness to refashion relations in the new context for peace, stability and prosperity.  India is enlightened enough to be more giving, more accommodating to the small neighbour in its landlocked setting.  Economic cooperation is the tested route to improving relations with the neighbour countries.  The scope is immense, even with all the projects already finished or in the works.  The twin problems of flood control (the Kosi’s depradations in Bihar too recent to be forgotten) and hydel power generation may have to wait until a firmer framework of two-way trust and mutual understanding is evolved, but should be pressed. 

An intellectual investment by India concerns our capacity for obtaining and collating information for decision making for forming  policies towards neighbour countries like Nepal .  While China and Pakistan are better covered by our researchers, the smaller neighbours are given scant attention and hardly figure in the media, although they impinge significantly on our foreign policy and security both episodically and continually. India needs to develop a large pool of Nepal specialists who can be called upon to inform and advise the Union and State governments from time to time.  The specialisation could be farmed out to many educational institutions, private companies and public sector companies with business interest or investment in Nepal , apart from established government sponsored agencies.  Official support could supplement the private efforts of groups interested in carrying out seminars and studies of this kind.  India has a long way to go in catching up with the major powers on area studies.

ASIA CENTRE is a registered 80G tax exempt non-profit organisation.