South Indian Inscriptions

EPIGRAPHIA INDICA

verse 4, the instantaneous slaughter, as recommended for the culprit, has been indicated by the interesting expression chakshur-vadha (i.e. ‘ slaughter at sight ’) in which the word chakshus has been used in the sense of ‘sight’. The confiscated property of the chief culprit was probably treated as pertaining to the whole village or was more probably assigned to the temple or temples of the locality. This is what was done in South India as we know from a number of inscription.^[1]

While verses 3-4 speak of the punishment of the principal offender and his abettor, the first half of the next stanza (verse 5) prescribes the punishment for the instigator of the crime. It is stated that the vimantṛi, i.e. the adviser of the chief culprit, should be vārita (cf. vārayan) and should be treated as an equal of a dog or an ass or a Chaṇḍāla. The causative form of the root vṛi may be taken to mean ‘ to hold captive ’ or ‘ to restrain ’. But the injunction that the instigator of the crime should be treated as a dog or an ass or a Chaṇḍāla seems to suggest that he was ostracised and that his movements were restricted. It has to be remembered in this connection that punishment by imprisonment was rather rare in ancient and early medieval India even in cases conducted in the king’s courts.^[2] Thus, while the chief offender was killed and his whole property confiscated and his abettor was expelled from the locality, his counsellor was permitted to stay in the village although nobody was allowed to have any intercourse with him.

The second half of verse 5, with which the document ends, states that the god Dvādaśārka was the witness [of the sthiti] and prays for the success of the same. The name Dvādaś-ārka refers to the conception of the twelve Ādityas in a single Sun-god called Dvādaś-ātman in the lexicons. Whether it was the name of the Sun-god worshipped at Lāhaḍapura cannot be determined. But the conception of the Sun as a witness of human deeds seems to be quite appropriate as he is called Lōka-lōchana (literally, ‘ the eye of the world ’) and Karma-sākshin (literally, ‘ the witness of [all] acts’) in the Sanskrit lexicons.

The question is now as to the capacity in which the Brāhaṇas of Lāhaḍapura issued the decree contained in the document under review. Of course the Smṛiti literature makes it abundantly clear that the particular jurisdiction of corporations of every kind was recognised by the ancient and medieval Hindu kings in the fullest measure and that the right of making laws for their corporations and composing disputes was often enjoyed by corporate bodies of farmers, craftsmen, cowherds, money-lenders, members of particular sects, robbers, actors, artisans, etc.^[2] No doubt the king of the country was advised to recognise and support the arrangements of and punishments inflicted by the chief of a family or a guild or of a corporation, and to interfere only when a dispute arose between a chief and his subordinates. But cases of grave crimes are stated to have been exclusively reserved for the king. This was, however, theoretical. In actual practice, inferior courts, such as those held by village assemblies, guilds, temple trustees and caste elders, appear to have been conducting criminal cases arising within their jurisdiction side by side with the courts headed by the king and his governors and subordinates without interruption from the government. A large number of South Indian inscriptions are known to prove that criminal cases including those involving homicide were decided by the village assembly or the community to which the accused belonged or the local people in general.^[4]

In the present case, the Brāhmaṇas of Lāhaḍapura do not appear to have been members of a corporation of their own community nor do the unsocial elements seem to have belonged to the

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^[1] Cf. T. V. Mahalingam, South Indian Polity, p. 234. Considering the punishment prescribed for robbery by the law-givers (Jolly, HLC, p. 273; Kane, Hist. Dharm., Vol. III, pp. 519 ff.), chakshur-vadha does not appear to mean ‘blinding the eyes.’
^[2] Cf. Jolly, Hindu Law and Custom, p. 282.
^[3] Jolly, op. cit., p. 293 ; N. C. Sengupta, Evolution of Ancient Indian Law, pp. 10-11, 259 ff., 3]60.
^[4] T. V. Mahalingam, op. cit., pp. 225 ff., 235. There is an interesting case, in which the village assembly and its officers as well as the local government officers and the royal army failed to apprehend certain dacoits and ultimately the co-operation of the local people was sought.